suggests that simplifying the tax system may be the most effective route to increasing taxpayer compliance. In his view, "The Pollyannaish notion that compliance problems will disappear if we lower tax rates or shift from an income to a consumption tax does not withstand even cursory analysis . . . [but] [b]ecause taxpayer morale is important, tax simplification may be a more promising course" (Graetz, 1997, p. 105). Using survey data, this paper explores the links between perceptions of simplicity of the tax system and compliance.
INTRODUCTION

I
n his thoughtful book, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax, Michael Graetz (1997) suggests that simplifying the tax system may be the most effective route to increasing taxpayer compliance. In his view, "The Pollyannaish notion that compliance problems will disappear if we lower tax rates or shift from an income to a consumption tax does not withstand even cursory analysis . . . [but] [b]ecause taxpayer morale is important, tax simplification may be a more promising course" (Graetz, 1997, p. 105) . Using survey data, this paper explores the links between perceptions of simplicity of the tax system and compliance.
Much of the existing literature on compliance focuses on the problem of deterrence. The goal of deterring evasion is usually sought through methods that create fear, for example, through increasing the probability of an audit or increasing the magnitude of a fine. The seminal article by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) analyzed the effect of audits and fines on individual utility maximization. The question analyzed in this paper is whether deterrence can also be achieved by positive incentives, as suggested by Smith and Stalans (1991) . Positive incentives are actions, other than threats of punishment, intended to increase compliance with laws. For example, a simplified tax system may create comfort (i.e., encourage compliance).
Several studies have taken alternative approaches to exploring the relationship between complexity, unfairness, and noncompliance. Sheffrin (1994) concluded that a "flat-tax" may or may not be perceived as unfair, depending on the public's knowledge and understanding of different notions of progressivity. Kaplow (1996) discusses examples of simple tax system scenarios that may be unfair. Smith (1992) , using data from the 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey (Harris and Asssociates, 1988) , found that complexity and fairness were just two of many factors affecting compliance.
Although our initial hypothesis was that complexity would lead to perceived unfairness, upon further reflection it is clear that there are several other countervailing theoretical factors. Warskett, Winer, and Hettich (1998) develop a theoretical explanation for the complexity of the tax system as an equilibrium outcome in a political economy framework (see also Hettich and Winer, (1988; 1999) . Kaplow (1998) raises another justification for a complex tax structure emphasizing the benefits to measuring income accurately (see also Kaplow, 1995) . In summary, there is no necessary theoretical link between the complexity of the tax system and its perceived unfairness that will hold over all places and time. Rather it will be an empirical question that needs to be addressed in the context of a specific tax system.
The next section presents our empirical analysis including a description of the data, the econometric model, and the results. We also discuss some caveats. The final part of the paper highlights our findings and suggests an avenue for further research.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To preview our empirical results, we do not find a consistent link between complexity and noncompliance. We conclude that complexity does not necessarily yield perceptions of an unfair tax system, but perceptions of an unfair tax system (whatever their source) may be a cause of noncompliance. This implies that deterrence of tax evasion may not necessarily be achieved by targeting tax laws for simplification.
Data and Model Specification
Our data set is the 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey, sponsored by the United States Internal Revenue Service and based on an in-person interview survey of United States income tax filers, conducted by Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Incorporated.
2 Although two versions of the survey were administered, since responses to each version separately reflect a national sample, in certain situations we treat similar (but not identical) questions from each version as though they were the same question.
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The 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey consists of responses collected in the fall of 1990 from 1,784 taxpayers. For various reasons, e.g., a taxpayer responded "not sure" or "refused," we were forced to re-duce the sample we analyzed to 1,194 observations. Tables 1 and 2 report Complexity ➝ Unfairness ➝ Evasion
The rationale for the model is that perceptions about complexity are formed at the first stage, which affect perceptions of unfairness formed at the second stage. Finally, perceptions of unfairness affect noncompliance at the third stage.
The foundations for our econometric model are found in the existing literature. Maddala (1983, pp. 108-13 ) discusses recursive logistic models and develops (Maddala, 1983 , Model 6 with equation (5.51)) a model very similar to the one described in this paper, except that his model uses a probit, rather than an ordered probit, regression. Maddala and Lee (1976) discuss an example using a logit regression; Maddala (1994, 1979) elaborate on how to calculate the correct standard errors.
We estimate an ordered probit model for each stage using maximum likelihood. The ordered probit model, in its general form, is discussed by both Greene (1997, pp. 926-31) and Maddala (1983, pp. 46-9) . Since we use a variable for scaled income 5 as a regressor in each stage, we assume that heteroscedasticity exists. Specifically, we assume multiplicative heteroscedasticity, 6 therefore the basic model for each stage is as follows:
where IC i is scaled income for individual i,
The µ's or thresholds are unknown parameters to be estimated along with β β β β β and α.
7 The regression model determines the influence of the vector of variables (x i ) on the unobserved (latent) continuous variable (y
* i
). Note that (α = 0) indicates a homoscedastic disturbance; we test whether our heteroscedastic specification is justified, by determining whether we can reject the null hypothesis (H 0 : α = 0).
In the first stage (denoted by the subscript "1"), an ordered probit regression is used to analyze the factors that influence a taxpayer's determination that the tax system is complex: The key regressor in Stage 1 is a dummy variable indicating the type of tax form used when the taxpayer last filed. The tax form dummy variable is included as a proxy for compliance costs; i.e., higher compliance costs (longer tax forms) are expected to be associated with greater perceived complexity:
(LL) any long tax form; (DR) don't remember.
9
The omitted categories are: (i) short form, 1040-EZ (for single people, under $50,000 income) and (ii) regular short form, 1040-A. Slemrod (1989a) hypothesized that complexity increases the cost of complying with tax laws and therefore increases noncompliance. In another article, Slemrod (1989b) discussed simulation results on the likely impact of eliminating itemized deductions and instituting a "flat-rate" income tax system. Slemrod found that a "flat-rate" would not be sufficient to significantly reduce the cost of compliance. We propose a different causal direction than Slemrod, i.e., higher compliance costs cause higher perceived complexity.
In addition to the key regressor (the tax form variable in Stage 1), seven socioeconomic variables are included in each stage: age, education, household income, dummy variables set equal to one if the respondent owned their home, if the respondent was married, if the respondent was male, and a dummy variable set equal to one if the respondent (or respondent's spouse) was self-employed. These variables all reflect differences in socioeconomic status, which may be correlated with different attitudes towards the tax system.
In the second stage (denoted by the subscript "2"), an ordered probit regression is used to analyze the factors that influence a taxpayer's determination that the tax system is unfair:
where ỹ 1i ≡ estimated Prob ( y 1i = "extremely complicated") i.e., estimated probability that individual i responds that federal income tax laws and rules are "extremely complicated." The unobserved continuous variable (y * 2i
) measures individual i's response to 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-4) question no. 2: "How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to the 1989 tax return-do you feel it is quite fair to most people, or reasonably fair, or somewhat unfair, or quite unfair to most people?" As a proxy for complexity, we use estimation results from the first stage, i.e., the estimated probability that each individual responds that federal income tax laws and rules are "extremely complicated."
10 This complexity proxy is the regressor denoted y
, and is used to estimate the influence on perceived unfairness, assuming that perceived complexity of the tax system was evaluated first (and not simultaneously).
We offer the following justification for using a proxy for complexity (an estimated probability from the first stage) in the second stage, rather than actual observed values (see Greene, 1997, pp. 926-7) . The observed values for complexity (i.e., 0, 1, … , 5) where "5" is extremely complicated and "0" is not at all complicated, do not convey information regarding the respondents' intensity of feelings. A respondent chooses the value that most closely represents their own feelings on the survey question, but the difference between, say, a "5" and a "4" is the same as between a "4" and a "3". The proxy for complexity, which can take on a wide range of values between""0" and "1" for each individual, attempts to better capture the respondents' intensity of feelings that depend on the regressors ( x 1 ). This argument, for using an estimated probability (proxy) in a subsequent stage, also applies in the next step using a proxy for unfairness as a regressor in the final (evasion) stage.
In addition to the proxy for complexity, two key regressors (expected to affect the taxpayer's perception regarding unfairness of the tax system) are examined in Stage 2: (i) a dummy variable representing perceived inadequate public good supply, and (ii) respondent's perception of the percentage of cheaters. These additions are based on prior research by Bordignon (1993) , citing Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) , suggesting that the tax payment that the taxpayer considers fair is a function of (i) public good supply (i.e., is the quantity/quality of government supplied goods adequate relative to the individual tax payment?), and (ii) the tax rate structure and/or perceived tax evasion by others (i.e., are all taxpayers paying their fair share?).
In the third (and final) stage (denoted by the subscript "3"), an ordered probit regression is used to analyze the factors which influence tax evasion:
where ỹ 2i ≡ estimated Prob (y 2i = "quite unfair") i.e., estimated probability that individual i responds that the federal income tax system is "quite unfair." The unobserved continuous variable (y * 3i ) measures individual i's response to 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, pp. III-10, III-11) Individual responses to both questions 14 and 15 are combined to form one variable indicating the highest level of admitted evasion. For example, if the response to question no. 14 is "probably have," but the response to question no. 15 is "definitely have not," then we infer the fictitious response: "probably have evaded."
As a proxy for unfairness, we use estimation results from the second stage, i.e., the estimated probability that each individual responds that the federal income tax system is "quite unfair." This unfairness proxy is the regressor denoted (ỹ 2i ), and is used to estimate the influence on tax evasion, assuming that perceived unfairness of the tax system was evaluated first (and not simultaneously).
In addition to the proxy for unfairness, two key regressors (expected to affect evasion) are included in Stage 3: (i) a dummy variable indicating that the respondent always seeks help to complete his/her tax forms, and (ii) respondent's perception of the probability of an audit. A higher probability of an audit is commonly thought to deter evasion. On the other hand, the dummy variable indicating that respondent seeks help (e.g., from an accountant) is included based on prior research by Erard (1993) suggesting that such assistance may be associated with increased evasion.
Tax form variables are also included as regressors in Stage 3. Here, rather than acting as proxies for compliance costs in Stage 1, the type of tax form used is intended to proxy for the opportunity to evade; i.e., longer tax forms imply greater opportunity. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the non-dummy variables. Looking at the sample mean values for the variables, members of our sample tend to perceive the United States income tax system as both complex (CX) and unfair (UR), but also respond that they probably have not evaded (EV) (despite believing on average that 42 percent of Americans do cheat (CT)).
Descriptive Statistics
11 Our average sample participant is 43 years old (AE), with 1 to 2 years of college education (EC), and an annual household income (IC) of $35,000.
The sample mean for our perceived probability of an audit variable (PA) is 0.15. This is consistent with the observation by Erard and Feinstein (1994) that in response to survey questions, taxpayers, on average, overestimate the probability of an audit; the actual probability of an audit was approximately 0.01 in 1986 (Erard and Feinstein, 1994, p. 78) . Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the dummy variables. Our sample participants tend to be married (MR), own their own home (OW), and feel that they do not get what they pay for in terms of public good supply from the government (IP).
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The survey frequency for married (MR) participants is noticeably lower than our sample mean (i.e., 0.51 < 0.67). This implies that when the sample was reduced (mainly due to "not sure" responses) from its original level of 1,784 down to 1,194 participants, many of the nonmarried participants were dropped. This increased the homogeneity of the sample towards "married," and may have contributed to the result in some of our regressions that the married (MR) variable is not statistically significant.
As a preliminary estimation of the data, Table 3 reports the (Jöreskog, 1994, polychoric) correlation matrix for the three primary variables: complexity (CX), unfairness (UR), and evasion (EV). All correlations are positive, which is consistent with our initial hypothesis that complexity leads to perceived unfairness; but none of the correlations are strikingly close to 1. It is noteworthy that the positive correlations between (i) complexity (CX) and unfairness (UR), and (ii) complexity (CX) and evasion (EV), are both stronger (i.e., closer to 1) than the correlation between unfairness (UR) and evasion (EV). However, these are simple correlations and do not include the effects of conditioning variables. Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas (1991) for the entire survey sample of 1,784 taxpayers or, where applicable, for the Version 1 survey sample of 890 taxpayers and for the Version 2 survey sample of 894 taxpayers. For tax system unfairness (UR), where no mean was reported by Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas (1991) , we compute a mean using the frequencies reported. Numbers in parentheses refer to the survey version (i.e., 1 or 2). Unless noted otherwise, where our numerical codes differ from those used in the original survey, we report a survey mean that is consistent with the numerical codes used to derive our sample mean. b This variable is the response to the question: "What was the last grade of school you completed?" (Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-31) . For example, 12 ≡ completed high school, 16 ≡ completed college. We treated a response of "post high school training, but no college" as equivalent to one year of college, i.e., 13 (which differs from the numerical code of 21 used in the original survey). c This variable is the highest value response from two questions: "Looking at this card and considering all sources of income, what was the approximate total income of your own before taxes in 1989?" and "Now look at the card again and tell me … the total amount of your own income plus your spouse's income in 1989." (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-33) . Survey participants were asked to specify the total income, within a certain range. The mean of the range, divided by 10,000, is used as the scaled income variable. A response of "$100,000 or more" is assigned a numerical code of 10. d This variable is the response to the question: "By the way, about what percent of taxpayers would you say try to cheat on their taxes to some extent?" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-13 
Econometric Results
We now proceed with a formal econometric model and testable hypotheses to more fully explore the relationships between complexity, unfairness, and evasion. The left-side of Table 4 reports our recursive ordered probit estimation results. The right-side of Table 4 is included for comparison purposes and will be discussed later. In analyzing the results, we focus on the signs of the coefficients and the statistical significance of the regressors. With the ordered probit model, the marginal effects for a change in the value of a regressor can be computed for every dependent variable category (i.e., for all (J + 1) categories) (see Greene, 1997, pp. 927-31 , for a discussion). For example, if a taxpayer 's age increases, we can calculate the marginal effect on the probability that an average taxpayer perceives the tax system to be (i) not at all complicated, (ii) extremely Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas (1991) for the entire survey sample of 1,784 taxpayers or, where applicable, for the Version 1 survey sample of 890 taxpayers and for the Version 2 survey sample of 894 taxpayers. Numbers in parentheses refer to the survey version (i.e., 1 or 2). Where our numerical codes differ from those used in the original survey, we report a survey frequency that is consistent with the numerical codes used to derive our sample mean. b The numerical code for the dummy variable (LL) is "1" if the taxpayer used any long tax form the last time he/ she filed, "0" otherwise. All other dummy variables are coded similarly. This dummy variable (LL), along with the next (DR), are in response to the question: "Which one of the following forms did you use the last time you filed?" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-4) . The following response was used as the omitted category: any short tax form. This variable is the response to the question: "Do you own the home you are living in, or are you renting?" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-32) . The numerical code for the dummy variable (OW) is "1" if the taxpayer response was "own," "0" otherwise. d This variable is the response to the question: "What is your current marital status?" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-32) . The numerical code for the dummy variable (MR) is "1" if the taxpayer response was "married," "0" otherwise. e This variable combines the responses from two questions: "(Is/Was) your spouse"self-employed?" and "(Are/ Were) you self-employed?" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, pp. III-32, III-33) . The numerical code for the dummy variable (SF) is "1" if the taxpayer response was "yes" to either question, "0" otherwise. f Survey version 1: "What I really object to about the federal income tax system is that I have to pay more than my fair share." Survey version 2: "My income taxes are much too high for what I get from the Federal Government" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-3) . If the response, on a 6-point scale, was any of the 3 choices closest to and including""Agree Strongly" (as opposed to "Disagree Strongly"), then the dummy variable is set equal to "1," otherwise the dummy variable is set equal to "0." g This variable is the response to the question: "During the past few years, how often have you completed your tax forms yourself, instead of getting help from someone else? Would you say you always do them yourself, usually do, sometimes do, or never do them yourself?" (Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 1991, p. III-4) . The numerical code for the dummy variable (HP) is "1" if the taxpayer response was "never do them yourself," "0" otherwise. Tables 1 and 2 for variable descriptions.   b In parentheses, the z-statistic is the parameter estimate divided by its asymptotic standard error, i.e., the null hypothesis is that the coefficient equals zero. complicated, and/or (iii) any response category between "not at all" and "extremely" complicated. As a formal matter, the sign of the marginal effects for the extreme categories (e.g., "not at all complicated" and "extremely complicated") will be of opposite signs. The marginal effect sign for the category assigned the high numerical code will have the same sign as that of the regression coefficient. To simplify our analysis we discuss marginal effects, with respect to the extreme dependent variable categories, in an informal manner. To capture statistical significance, Table 4 contains"z-statistics (coefficient divided by standard error).
Starting with the key results, in Stage 2 the unexpected sign on the proxy for complexity (PC) indicates that complexity and unfairness are negatively correlated, but the variable is not statistically significant. Therefore we conclude that taxpayers may not necessarily consider a complex tax system to be an unfair tax system. On the other hand, in Stage 3, the proxy for unfairness (PU) is statistically significant. We can conclude that an unfair tax system positively influences tax evasion.
Let's turn now to a closer examination of the results. First, the variance variable, at the bottom of Table 4 , is significant in all three stages, justifying our heteroscedastic specification.
The tax form variable (LL) (any long tax form) has a positive estimated coefficient and is significant in both Stages 1 and 3. In Stage 1, the positive sign makes intuitive sense by indicating that higher compliance costs (with a long form relative to a short form) are associated with higher perceived complexity. In Stage 3, the positive sign indicates that a greater opportunity to evade (with a long form relative to a short form) is associated with greater evasion.
Also in Stage 1, education (EC) is a significant factor in determining whether a taxpayer considers the tax system to be complex. As expected, when education (EC) levels increase, the perception of complexity decreases.
In Stage 2, both inadequate public good supply (IP) and cheating by others (CT) are significant. Both coefficients are positive, indicating that either lowerquantity/poorer-quality of public goods (IP) or increased perceived cheating by taxpayers in general (CT), will tend to increase the probability that the average taxpayer perceives the tax system to be quite unfair.
In Stage 3, several variables are significant. Income (IC), self-employment (SF), and male gender (ME) are all positively correlated with evasion. Age (AE), home ownership (OW), and being married (MR), are negatively correlated with evasion.
With respect to the tax help (HP) variable (in Stage 3), our result is not consistent with Erard's (1993) finding that assistance from tax professionals may lead to increased evasion. The statistical insignificance of tax help (HP) may be due to two offsetting effects: tax assistance may either promote good faith reporting or promote avoidance as taxpayers gain sophistication.
Self-employment (SF) (included to control for the opportunity to evade) is significant in all three stages, and positively correlated with complexity, unfairness, and evasion. In other words, a change to self-employment (and a greater opportunity to evade) will increase the probability that the average taxpayer perceives the tax system to be extremely complicated and quite unfair, and ultimately increase the probability that the average taxpayer responds that he/she has definitely evaded. This ultimate outcome regarding evasion is consistent with U.S. General Accounting Office (1995, p. 1) testimony that "wage earners report 97 percent of their wages; the self-employed report 36 percent of their income; and 'informal suppliers'-self-employed individuals who operate on a cash basis-report just 11 percent of theirs."
An unexpected result is the insignificance of the probability of an audit (PA) variable on evasion in Stage 3 (although the sign is as anticipated). One explanation may be related to the conclusion by Sheffrin and Triest (1992, p. 214 ) that "[i]ncreased enforcement efforts might result in a perverse indirect increase in future noncompliance if the enforcement mechanism reveals to the affected taxpayer . . . that it is relatively easy to get away with evasion." Tittle (1995, p. 216) discusses this same idea for crimes in general, i.e., the effect of experience on lowering the perceived probability of punishment. Slemrod et. al. (2001, p. 482) conclude that high-income taxpayers may not respond because of "a perception that an audit will not automatically detect and punish all evasion . . ." Our result is consistent with Paternoster et. al. (1983, p. 457) who are critical of the "deterrence doctrine" (i.e., critical of the theory that "the perception of certain, swift, and severe sanctions will keep people from committing sanctionable behavior").
Caveats
At this point it is important to note several caveats to our key results. Our first remark relates to the data itself, survey data. Although responses to an in-person survey may be considered reliable relative to, say, mail or telephone surveys, there is still the possibility of misleading responses from individuals. Our position is that, by its very nature, evasion data is hard to acquire, and data from a professionally performed survey may arguably be the best available of individual selfreports.
Second, we have assumed a very specific causal flow, i.e., from (i) perceived complexity, to (ii) perceived unfairness, to (iii) evasion. Smith (1992, pp. 244-5) suggests that taxpayers may first evade, not get caught, and then perceive the tax system to be less unfair. However, his reverse causal relation was suggested to explain his own unexpected estimation results.
Third, as discussed previously regarding Stage 3, the evasion variable (EV) combines responses to questions about overstating deductions and understating income. Although these would be different specifications of the model, we can reestimate the final stage regression with a regressand reflecting only one form of evasion (overstating deductions or understating income). The proxy for unfairness (PU) becomes statistically insignificant with a regressand reflecting only understated income; but stays statistically significant with a regressand reflecting only overstated deductions.
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For a further check on model specification, the right-side of Table 4 reports results from running three ordered probit regressions with the same regressors in each without any recursive structure. The results reported on the right-side give an indication of the statistical significance of each regressor in each stage and can be used as a diagnostic check for omitted regressors. We do find one interesting result from this specification exercise. In this model, increased perceived cheating by taxpayers (CT) is a significant factor affecting evasion.
14 After respecifying the recursive model and including the (CT) variable in Stage 3, the proxy for unfairness (PU) becomes statistically insignificant. One possible explanation for this result may relate to multicollinearity between (CT) and (PU). This finding underscores the necessity of recognizing that some of our results are sensitive to the specification of the model. Fourth (and last), complexity does positively and significantly affect both perceived unfairness and evasion if a regressor (CX) representing the actual observed value for complexity (i.e., 0, 1, … , or 5) is used (rather than the proxy (PC)). As explained by Jöreskog (1994, p. 383), "[o] rdinal variables [e.g., (CX)] are not continuous variables and should not be treated as if they are." Therefore an analysis using (CX) as a regressor is not appropriate, but does indicate the sensitivity of the results to the econometric methods.
CONCLUSION
Our empirical results suggest that simplifying the United States income tax system may not be an effective deterrent to income tax evasion, at least based on taxpayer attitude surveys. We found no systematic links between perceptions of complexity and perceptions of unfairness. We generally found that increased perceptions of fairness led to improved compliance. Although there is an intuitive appeal to the notion that reducing complexity may lead to an increased perception of fairness and subsequent improved compliance, there are plausible contrary viewpoints. Complexity may be necessary to produce fairness, once individual circumstances (e.g., medical conditions) are taken into account. It is also possible that political competition produces an equilibrium level of complexity that maximizes political support.
We should emphasize that our research only focuses on links between complexity, unfairness, and noncompliance within the existing tax structure. A radically new tax structure would pose different issues for both complexity and compliance. Moreover, complexity is only one component of tax equity.
A possible extension of our research would analyze how our results may differ when the contribution by non-filers is considered. Since our data set only included survey responses by filers (i.e., taxpayers that filed a tax return within the previous 2 years) (see Schulman, Ronca, and Bucuvalas, 1991, p. I-2) , our conclusions may change if responses by nonfilers are added. Non-filers may have an effect on our conclusions because some non-filers may find the tax compliance process too complicated to be understood (see U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979, p. 8) . To the extent that a large number of non-filers perceive the tax system to be extremely complicated and quite unfair, simplifying the tax system may be an effective deterrent to income tax evasion.
Finally, we do note that survey instruments may be imprecise and that taxpayers may not always convey their true feelings in these interviews. Nonetheless, our results indicate that we should be extremely cautious in assuming that a movement to reduce complexity will automatically lead to increased compliance.
